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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION MODEL AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW DISPUTES
Richard W. Hulberr
As someone who has been close to the ICC for more than fifteen
years, my position on this afternoon's topic must seem preordained, except
to those cynical enough to believe that familiarity breeds contempt rather
than. more familiarity. Although, or perhaps because, I am a strong
proponent of international commercial arbitration as it now is, I have some
concerns about the adequacy and appropriateness of it as a model for the
resolution of the kinds of public law questions that have come up and
surely will arise with ever increasing frequency under the now thousands
of treaties providing for arbitration of investment disputes.
I do not question what Judge Holtzmann has said about the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal and its use of the same UNCITRAL Rules,
that are frequently an option under the investment treaties. The Tribunal
has been a grand success and in no small part because of the quality of the
judges who have served it. Arbitration before the Tribunal, however, is
quite a different animal from ordinary international commercial arbitration
or from the structure provided for treaty arbitration of investments. We
notice that the Tribunal has "judges", indeed, it has a stable cadre of these
judges, it sits in one place, the Hague, it publishes its decisions, as any
proper court should do, and no doubt over the years it has developed a set
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1. The Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law
(adopted by UNCITRAL on April 28, 1976, and approved by United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 31/95 on December 15, 1976) [hereinafter the UNCITRAL Rules.] The UNCITRAL
Rules are reprinted in II YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 147 (1977).
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of procedures, modes of proof and terms of substantive jurisprudence well
known to the bar that practices before it.2
This recital will bring to mind the many points of difference between
the Iran-United States Tribunal and what I will call ordinary international
arbitration. I will briefly touch on three of them: confidentiality, fluidity
of process, and the uncertain or varying degree of judicial review.
First as to confidentiality. In ICC practice this is carried to the point
that the ICC will not even confirm that X and Y are parties to an
arbitration pending before it. Confidentiality is required under the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules3, frequently availed of in investment treaty
arbitrations, as it is under the UNCITRAL Rules., Confidentiality appears
to be one of the most significant attractions of international commercial
arbitration for the parties that resort to it.' In the usual case the hearings
are closed6 and the award remains undisclosed, unless there are subsequent
judicial proceedings. Consideration surely must be given to whether it is
2. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need for
Some Standard Rules, 28 INT'L LAW. 47, 49-54 (1994) (reporting on the principles "routinely
applie[d]" by the Hague Tribunal in evaluating evidence).
3. Article 14(2) requires each arbitrator to sign a declaration that includes the statement
that "I shall keep confidential all information coming to my knowledge as a result of my
participation in this proceeding as well as the contents of any award made by the Tribunal." If
he fails to do so by the conclusion of the first session of the tribunal, he "shall be deemed to have
resigned." Id. Under article 24(1) "The deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private
and remain secret." Article 39(2) states that "The Tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the
parties, which other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses
and experts during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal may attend the hearings." Under
article 44(2) the minutes of hearings "shall not be published without the consent of the parties."
4. Article 25(4) provides that "Hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties
otherwise agree." Article 35(2) provides that "The award may be made public only with the
consent of the parties."
5. According to the results of a recent survey of practitioners and users of international
commercial arbitration, the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings ranked behind only the
neutrality of the forum and the assurance of worldwide enforcement of the award as an attraction
of arbitration. CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 395-96 (1996).
6. This is explicitly provided for in the major international arbitration rules. Arbitration
Rules of the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (the
ICC Rules)(1998), art. 21(3) ("Save with the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties,
persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted [to the hearings]"); Arbitration
Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA Rules) (1998), art. 19.4 ("All
meetings and hearings shall be private unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the
Arbitral Tribunal directs otherwise"); International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA International Arbitration Rules) (1997), art. 20(4) ("Hearings are private
unless the parties agree otherwise or the law provides to the contrary"); UNCITRAL Rules,
article 25(4), supra note 4.
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an appropriate element of litigations (before arbitrators, to be sure) that
challenge important national regulation.
A second attraction of ordinary international commercial arbitration is
the very fluidity of the available procedures. All the major international
arbitration rules, again including the UNCITRAL Rules, leave the shaping
of a particular case to the expectations, desires and traditions of the parties
and the arbitrators.7 It is, in fact, the very intention of these rules to
accommodate different legal traditions and legal cultures. Whether there is
any discovery at all, how witnesses are questioned, whether partisan expert
testimony may be presented-these and many other such questions are left
for case by case arrangement. Some might well conclude that such
uncertainty is an obstacle to adjudication of public law questions.
These two issues may be thought to take on particular importance in
the context of treaty arbitration of public law regulations when one
considers that, although the details of the individual cases will vary, these
arbitrations are primarily focused on giving content to or interpretation and
implementation of the treaty constraints on government action that affects
investment. How does a consistent jurisprudence develop if a decision
must be reached in substantial ignorance of others on the same issue? In
private commercial arbitration, by contrast, the issues in controversy are
all over the lot and usually of narrow compass or effect, and the applicable
law is whatever the parties have chosen.,
A third circumstance that almost surely matters less in respect of
private international arbitration than in public law arbitration is the varying
degree of post-award judicial scrutiny. Under ICSID procedures
(applicable in many investment treaty arbitrations), there is no national
court review of any kind: the national court's obligation under Article 54
of the Washington Convention is simply to enforce. 9 On the other hand, an
7. ICC Rules, art. 15(1); LCIA Rules, art. 14.1; AAA International Arbitration Rules,
art. 16(1); UNCITRAL Rules, art. 15(1). These provisions reflect the principle enunciated in
Article 19(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985):
"Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the. proceedings." This provision has been
described by the UNCITRAL Secretariat as "the Magna Carta of Arbitral Procedure." See
HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY
364-68 (1989).
8. This generalization is subject to the possible application of what is usually termed the
"mandatory law" of a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction whose law has been stipulated as
applicable by the agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law
Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 242-254 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1986).
9. Paragraph 1 of article 54 provides in part as follows: "Each Contracting State shall
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
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award rendered under the ICSID Additional Facility procedures, which are
not subject to the Washington Convention, or under the UNCITRAL
Rules, is subject to whatever judicial review is available under local law at
the place of arbitration and under Article V of the New York Convention
almost everywhere.10  If coherent investment treaty interpretation is
desirable, or even judged indispensable, is this diversity in the review
process constructive?
If there are issues as to process, there are also implications that arise
from the possible results of these treaty arbitrations. In the usual case the
investor challenges host country regulation. What is the standard by which
such a challenge is to be weighed? Is it something akin to the traditional
American view of what constitutes a taking? Under the Fifth Amendment
it has recently been held by the Supreme Court that "mere diminution in
the value of something, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a
taking."" Or is it the proposition announced by the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal in the SEDCO case some years ago, that "a state is not
liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide regulation
within the accepted 'police power' of states?"" Or is it something else, or
several somethings else, applied variously by successive arbitral panels
operating confidentially and substantially or totally immune from judicial
review? Is this a recipe for success?
If arbitral procedures are applied where they do not necessarily fit
well, injurious consequences may follow for the arbitral process where it
does serve well. In some countries, though not the United States, pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in consumer or employment contracts are not
enforceable.' 3 Where, as in this country, they are enforceable14-at least so
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were the final judgment of a court
in that State."
10. Article V of the New York Convention establishes the minimum standards for
recognition of a foreign award in every state that is a party to it. By contrast, it is generally
accepted that an award may be set aside only in the state where (or under the law of which) the
award was rendered, and that in setting aside an award the state where it was rendered is not
constrained by the New York Convention in the scope of its review. See International Standard
Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (New
York District Court had no authority to set aside an arbitral award rendered in Mexico); Yusuf
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "W" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) (an award in
international arbitration rendered in the United States may be set aside for "manifest disregard of
the law" although that is not a permitted ground under the New York Convention on which an
international award rendered abroad may be refused recognition).
11. Concrete Pipe & Prod. Co. of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
12. SEDCO Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-US C.T.R. 248, 275 (1985).
13. For example, under Article 2061 of the French Civil Code, predispute arbitration
clauses, as distinct from the submission to arbitration of existing disputes, is generally authorized
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far-there is ample evidence of intense pressure on the court system to
intrude into the arbitration process in the interest of perceived "fairness"l":
is the expense prohibitive, is the panel fairly composed, is there adequate
access to necessary evidence, did the arbitrator, to cite a recent decision in
the Second Circuit, "manifestly disregard the law or the evidence or
both?"16  A concern one might reasonably have is that prophylactic
doctrines justifying increased court intervention into arbitration, contrived
to deal with such perceived problems, will be unthinkingly extended to
international arbitrations between sophisticated business enterprises, where
they are not needed and where they would run counter to the most
significant attraction of international commercial arbitration, its freedom
from interference by national courts.'7
I am concerned that judicial action along similar lines may follow if
arbitral decisions of public law questions are seriously unacceptable in the
politics of the host country, with a negative spill-over effect on current
practice in private international commercial arbitration. Courts will not
necessarily restrain themselves, as the Indonesian courts did not in the
recent CalEnergy geothermal project cases.,, Constraints on judicial
review can be evaded or ignored. Indeed, treaties can be denounced or
simply not adhered to. Dubious doctrines may well be born of difficult
cases.
In light of the foregoing, it would be well to consider improvements
that could be introduced into arbitration of public law questions which
would represent departures from the international commercial arbitration
model, such as substantive standards applied with reasonable uniformity,
transparent procedures, available jurisprudence, and perhaps, following the
example of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the establishment of
panels of arbitrators. In that way the undoubted value of honest and
only for contracts concluded "by reason of professional activity," as distinct from submission of
existing disputes to arbitration, permitted by article 2059. Article 631 of the Commercial Code
confines the permitted scope of pre-dispute arbitration clauses to matters over which the
commercial courts have jurisdiction.
14. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
16. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1034 (1999).
17. The Bdhring-Uhle study, supra note 5, lists neutrality-primarily freedom from the
intrusion of the national courts of either contracting party-as the "most highly relevant"
attraction of international commercial arbitration.
18. See Mark Kantor, International Project Finance and Arbitration with Public Sector
Entities: When is Arbitrability a Fiction?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1122 (2001).
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neutral decisions that international arbitration can provide may be brought
effectively to bear on these important questions.
